



# **Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures**

## **Burkina Faso**

### **1st Enhanced Follow-up Report**

**Follow-up Report**

**APRIL 2021**





The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA) is a specialized institution of ECOWAS and a FATF Style Regional Body that promotes policies to protect member States financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The FATF Recommendations are recognised as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorist financing (CTF) standard.

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*1<sup>st</sup> Enhanced Follow-up Report*

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# BURKINA FASO: FIRST ENHANCED FOLLOW-UP REPORT

## I. Introduction

1. The mutual evaluation report (MER) of the Burkina Faso was adopted in May 2019. Burkina Faso has requested for technical compliance re-ratings on 9 FATF Recommendations. This is Burkina Faso's first Follow-up Report (FUR) and it analyses progress in addressing some technical compliance deficiencies identified in its MER as well as the implementation of new requirements relating to FATF Recommendations which have changed since the on-site visit Recommendations (R.) 2, and 15). On the whole, countries are expected to have resolved most, if not all, of the technical compliance deficiencies by the end of the third year following the adoption of their MERs. This report does not address what progress Burkina Faso has made to improve its effectiveness.

## II. FINDINGS OF THE MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT

2. The MER rated<sup>1</sup> Burkina Faso for technical compliance as follows:

**Table 1. Technical Compliance Ratings, May 2019**

<b>R.1-</b>	<b>R.2</b>	<b>R.3</b>	<b>R.4</b>	<b>R.5</b>	<b>R.6</b>	<b>R.7</b>	<b>R.8</b>	<b>R.9</b>	<b>R.10</b>
LC	PC	C	LC	PC	PC	PC	PC	C	LC
<b>R.11</b>	<b>R.12</b>	<b>R.13</b>	<b>R.14</b>	<b>R.15</b>	<b>R.16</b>	<b>R.17</b>	<b>R.18</b>	<b>R.19</b>	<b>R.20</b>
LC	LC	LC	PC	C	LC	LC	LC	PC	LC
<b>R.21</b>	<b>R.22</b>	<b>R.23</b>	<b>R.24</b>	<b>R.25</b>	<b>R.26</b>	<b>R.27</b>	<b>R.28</b>	<b>R.29</b>	<b>R.30</b>
C	PC	LC	PC	PC	PC	C	NC	C	C
<b>R.31</b>	<b>R.32</b>	<b>R.33</b>	<b>R.34</b>	<b>R.35</b>	<b>R.36</b>	<b>R.37</b>	<b>R.38</b>	<b>R.39</b>	<b>R.40</b>
C	PC	LC	PC	LC	C	LC	LC	LC	LC

3. Given these results and Burkina Faso's level of effectiveness, GIABA placed the country in Enhanced Follow-up<sup>2</sup>. The assessment of Burkina's request for new technical compliance ratings and the preparation of this report were undertaken by the GIABA Secretariat and an Expert of the Evaluation and Compliance Group (ECG) Expert Review Team.

4. Section III of this report summarises Burkina Faso's progress in improving technical compliance. Section IV sets out the conclusion and a table showing the Recommendations which have been re-rated.

<sup>1</sup> There are four possible levels of technical compliance: Compliant (C), Largely Compliant (LC), Partially Compliant (PC) and Non-compliant (NC).

<sup>2</sup> Enhanced follow-up is based on the GIABA's traditional policy that deals with members with significant deficiencies (for technical compliance or effectiveness) in their AML/CFT systems, and involves a more intensive process of follow-up.

### III. OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS TO IMPROVE TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE

5. This section summarises Burkina Faso's progress to improve its technical compliance by:

- Resolving the technical compliance deficiencies identified in the MER, and
- Implementing new requirements where the FATF Recommendations have changed since the adoption of the MER (R.2, R.15).

#### 3.1. Progress in Addressing the Technical Compliance Deficiencies Identified in the MER

6. Burkina Faso has made progress in resolving the technical compliance deficiencies identified in its MER with regard to Recommendation 28 (which was rated NC), Recommendations 2, 5, 22, and 34 (which were rated PC), and Recommendations 4 and 35 (which were rated LC).

7. In view of this progress, Burkina Faso has been re-rated on Recommendation 5. Burkina Faso has adopted measures to improve its technical compliance on Recommendations 2,4,22, 28, 34 and 35, however, the progress made is insufficient to justify a re-rating of these Recommendations. The rating for Recommendation 15 has been downgraded.

##### *3.1.1. Recommendation 4 [R.4] - Confiscation and Provisional Measures (initially rated LC - No re-rating)*

8. In its 2<sup>nd</sup> MER, Burkina Faso was rated LC on R.4. The major technical deficiency was the fact that the legal framework did not provide for the confiscation of instrumentalities used or intended to be used in the commission of all predicate offences. Only drug-related offences, counterfeiting, corruption, information technology and financial sector offences (financial crimes) were covered.

9. Burkina Faso has adopted a number of measures to enable the competent authorities to confiscate the instrumentalities used or intended to be used in the commission of all the predicate offences, taking into account the rights of bona fide third parties. The Code of Criminal Procedure have been modified. The current Penal Code (Law N°025-2018/AN), under Article 214-23, provides that *“the additional sanction of confiscation shall be incurred in cases provided for by the law or regulation. It shall also legally incurred for crimes and offences liable to imprisonment for a period of more than one year, with the exception of media offences ...”*. “Paragraph 2 of the same article states that *“Confiscation shall be imposed on all movable or immovable property of any kind, whether divided or undivided, which was used or intended to be used to commit the offence and of which the convicted person is the owner or, subject to the rights of the owner in good faith, of which he has free disposal.”*All predicate offences shall henceforth be taken into account because their penalty, if committed, now stands at more than one year in positive Burkinabè law. Also, the new articles 251-2 and 252-2 of LAW No. 040-2019/AN of 29 May 2019 on the Code of Criminal Procedure of Burkina Faso allow judicial police officers acting in flagrante delicto investigations or preliminary investigations to seize the weapons and instruments used to commit the offence.

10. Regard for third party rights that makes provision for repossession, freehold on freezing orders, seizure and confiscation, is regulated by various texts, namely Articles. 96 and 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; Articles 83 para. 2, 87 and 104 para. 3 of the Anti-corruption law and Art. 99, 103, 105 to 107, 128 and 129 of the AML/CFT law 016.

11. Regarding the deficiency relating to the absence of steps that will prevent or void actions that prejudice the country's ability to freeze or seize or recover property that is subject to confiscation, it is indicate that in article 83, paragraph 3 of law n004-2015/CNT of 3/03/2015 on the prevention and repression of corruption in Burkina Faso, as well as article 335-4 of the penal code of 2018 (law n025/AN of 31/05/2018 on the Penal Code) states that "The court shall also order the confiscation of the misappropriated property or the value of the interest or gain obtained, even if this property has already been passed on to the ascendants, descendants, collaterals, spouse and allies of the convicted person, whether they have remained in their state or been converted into any other value". This measure deal only with the corruption offence and do not cover all the underlying offences.

12. In order to ensure enforcement of the additional penalty of confiscation in accordance with the conditions defined in article 214-23 of the Criminal Code., the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for and organizes the management of other forms of seizure (seizures provided for in the Penal Code: Art. 531-1 to 531-8; asset seizure: Art. 532-1 real property seizure : Articles 533-1 to 533-3; seizures relating to certain current intangible assets or rights: Articles 534-1 to 534-5, seizures without dispossession: Article 535-1; management and recovery of frozen, seized or confiscated assets in criminal matters : Articles. 536-1 to 536-37).

13. The modalities for collaboration between the criminal investigation officers, the public prosecution department, the investigative or trial courts and the future national structure in charge of the management and recovery of seized or confiscated assets are provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure under Articles 536-1-536-37. To date, the bill establishing the ANAGRASC quoted in the MER is yet to be passed into law.

**14. Burkina Faso confiscation framework still have some shortcomings. The LC rating on Rec. 4 remains.**

***3.1.2. Recommendation 5 [R.5] - Terrorist Financing Offence (initially rated PC - New rating (C))***

15. In its 2<sup>nd</sup> MER, Burkina Faso was rated PC on R.5. The major technical deficiency was the fact that the country had not criminalized the financing of individual terrorists and terrorist organizations. Considering Burkina Faso's risk profile and the contextual information on the country, including the lack of prosecutions in the area of terrorist financing, greater emphasis was laid on the deficiencies under criterion 5.2.

16. Burkina Faso's new Penal Code entered into force on 21<sup>st</sup> June 2019, with law n° 044-2019/AN of 06/21/2019 amending Law n° 025-2018/AN of 31<sup>st</sup> May 2018 relating to the Penal Code. Articles 361-23 and 361-24 provides that a sentence of five to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of five million (5,000,000) to ten million (10,000,000) CFA francs, shall be meted out on whoever, by any means whatsoever, directly or indirectly, illicitly and deliberately,

provides or collects, manages any funds, securities or assets with the intention of having them used or knowing that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of committing. (c) any act of providing or raising funds knowing that they will be used, in whole or in part, by a terrorist organization, a terrorist individual or a group of terrorists for any purpose. The notion of "for any purpose" indicates that the offence of terrorist financing applies even for a purpose not related to the commission of a specific terrorist act or acts. Similarly, it is clearly stated that the offence is committed even if the funds collected were not actually used in the commission of the offence. Thus, in the event of conviction, the trial court can order the freezing, confiscation of all assets and the prohibition from travelling or staying in the country.

17. Articles 362-1&2 of the Penal Code (law n°044-2019/AN of 21/06/2019) deal with criminal association and assistance to criminals and therefore with the contribution to the commission of an offence by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Similarly, under aggravating circumstances, Article 120.3 of Law n°016-2016/AN relating to the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in Burkina Faso provides for double penalties "when the offence of terrorist financing is committed by an organised group.

**18. Burkina Faso addressed deficiencies identified with respect to this recommendation. On this basis, R.5 is re-rated C.**

*3.1.3. Recommendation 22 [R. 22] - DNFBPs/Customer due Diligence (initially rated PC-No re-rating )*

19. In its 2<sup>nd</sup> MER, Burkina Faso was rated PC on R.22. The major technical deficiencies related to the absence of provisions on record keeping obligations of at least 5 years for lawyers and notaries after the completion of the transaction, to comply with the requirements relating to new technologies provided for in Recommendation 15 and those relating to the use of third parties provided for in Recommendation 17, in the situations provided for in criterion 22.1

20. Since the adoption of its MER, Burkina Faso has taken a certain number of measures designed to supervise the DNFBP sector. Thus, Decree No. 2019-1223/PRES/PM/MINEFID of 12/05/2019 establishing a complementary list of persons subject to the obligations to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, thereby expanding the list of DNFBPs accountable to AML/CFT&P. Henceforth, AML/CFT reporting entities include agencies and companies transporting people and goods, petroleum products management companies (SONABHY and other marketers of petroleum products and lubricants, companies operating in the areas of public works and property development. Similarly, a second Decree No. 2019-1237/PRES/PM/MINEFID/MSECU/MJ of 10/12/2019 establishing and designating the supervisory and monitoring authorities of all reporting entities in the non-financial sector in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have been adopted.

21. These measures, though fundamental, have not automatically resolved all the deficiencies identified rated in the MER. It is expected that these various government departments newly empowered to ensure supervision and monitoring in the area of AML/CFT & P can respectively take adequate measures to compel and assist the DNFBPs under their supervision to satisfactorily implement the AML/CFT preventive measures based on their risks.

22. **The deficiencies identified are still moderate. The PC rating on Rec.22 remains.**

***3.1.4. Recommendation 28 [R. 28] - Regulation and Supervision of Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (initially rated N C - No new rating)***

23. In its 2<sup>nd</sup> MER, Burkina Faso was rated NC for R.28. The major technical deficiencies were the lack of a specific provision on the legislative and regulatory measures preventing criminals or their accomplices from owning or becoming the beneficial owners of a significant part of a casino or from controlling it, the lack of authority explicitly designated to ensure compliance of Casinos and other categories of DNFBPs with their AML/CFT obligations, as well as the lack of risk-based supervision.

24. The Burkinabé system has recorded some developments with the adoption of Decree n° 2019-1237/PRES/PM/MINEFID/MSECU/MJ of 10/12/2019, on the designation and responsibilities of the supervisory and monitoring authorities of the non-financial sector in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Adopted by Cabinet on 11/10/2019) with a view to resolving the deficiencies identified in the MER.

25. **Designation of Supervisory Authority and Mechanism:** Decree n° 2019-1237 designates the State Treasury and Public Accounting (DGTCP), more specifically the Studies and Financial Legislation Department (DELF) as the authority in charge of monitoring and supervision of casinos and games of chance, regarding AML/CFT issues. For legal professionals (lawyers, notaries, bailiffs, auctioneers, administrators and legal agents, company and trust service providers), it is the Department of Public Judicial Officers at the Ministry of Justice. With the exception of Chartered and Certified Accountants, the Decree covers all DNFBPs identified in Burkina Faso, including the five (5) new DNFBPs added to the list of reporting entities.

26. With this text, the principle of monitoring the implementation of AML/CFT&P measures has been provided for, particularly through on-site and off-site inspection, development of guidelines, development and implementation of supervision and monitoring procedures, sectoral risk assessment, etc...). These authorities have just been designated and are yet to map out their strategic supervision and inspection plan to commence monitoring and supervision and ensure that they meet their AML/CFT obligations.

27. **Power to monitor, sanction and screen access to professions:** Article 4 of Decree No. 2019-1237 gives all designated supervisory authorities the requisite powers to perform their responsibilities, including powers to monitor compliance and mete out sanctions. Article 7 of the Decree stipulates that all facts discovered during inspections, and liable to disciplinary and/or criminal sanctions shall be brought to the attention of the FIU or State Prosecutor, pursuant to the AML/CFT Law No. 16 -2016/AN of 3<sup>rd</sup> May 2016 in Burkina Faso. However, no indication of the range of administrative and disciplinary sanctions in case of non-compliance with obligations AML/CFT to be defined by the respective supervisory authorities, has been made available or provided by the country. Consequently, their effective, proportionate and dissuasive nature cannot be assessed.

28. For all DNFBPs, the country has not provided any additional information to demonstrate that there are legislative and regulatory measures preventing criminals or their accomplices from holding or becoming beneficial owners of a significant stake or control of any DNFBP.

29. **Risk-based supervision:** Article 7 of Decree No. 2019- 1237 provides that on-site inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the extant procedures. Such inspections shall be organized taking into account the risks and at least once every two (2) years. This provision thus lays down the principle of the ML/TF risk-based inspection. It is clear that this provision alone does not meet requirements (a) and (b) of criterion 28.5. These two requirements dealing with the risk-based approach in supervision, actually requires the various supervisory authorities to establish an internal surveillance and monitoring process based on ML/TF risk which determines the frequency and intensity of their inspection measures. This therefore presupposes that they clearly have a prior understanding of the ML/TF risks at domestic level, those linked to their respective sector of activity; and establish a profile of the businesses in their sector based on the AML/CFT risks. The information provided by the country is not adequate to conclude that monitoring and inspections are carried out using the risk-based approach.

30. The Burkina Faso regime has recorded some progress in the area of supervision and **monitoring** of DNFBPs with regard to AML/CFT with the adoption of Decree No. 2019-1237/PRES/PM/MINEFID/MSECU/MJ of 10/12/2019, establishing the designation and responsibilities of the supervisory and monitoring authorities of reporting entities in the non-financial sector with regard to the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. All DNFBPs have been covered by this text, with the exception of, Chartered and Certified Accountants. However, the recent designation of these supervisory authorities, even with this Decree, has not, has not resolved all the deficiencies, particularly the lack of supervision strategy and inspection plan in order to commence the monitoring and inspection, the lack of a range of administrative sanctions defined by the supervisory authorities, failure to supervise/inspect using the risk-based approach, the lack of evidence to show there are legislative and regulatory measures designed to prevent criminals or their associates from holding or becoming beneficial owners of a significant stake or control of casinos and other DNFBPs. **These are significant deficiencies. Burkina Faso remains rated NC with R.28.**

### *3.1.5. Recommendation 34 [R. 34]-Guidance and Feedback (initially rated PC-no re-rating)*

31. In its 2<sup>nd</sup> MER, Burkina Faso was rated PC on R.34. The major technical deficiency was the lack of guidance for DNFBPs due to the lack of designated competent authorities, or self-regulatory bodies with empowered to carry out AML/CFT supervision and monitoring.

32. Decree No. 2019- 1237/PRES/PM/MINEFID/MSECU/MJ of 10.12.2019 establishing the designation and responsibilities of supervisory and monitoring authorities of reporting entities in the non-financial sector with regard to the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, designates the supervisory and monitoring authorities DNFBPs. This progress in the DNFBP sector is to acknowledge as being essential to resolve the identified deficiency in this



Recommendation. This effort alone does not automatically resolve the identified deficiency. As stated under Article 4, some measures (developing directives, guidelines or recommendations) need to be taken by the newly designated supervisory/monitoring authorities to regulate and guide DNFBPs in the effective implementation of AML/CFT preventive measures based on their risks and suspicious transactions reporting.

**33. The deficiency relating to the lack of guidelines for DNFBPs is still outstanding. The PC rating on Rec. 34 remains.**

### *3.1.6. Recommendation 35 [R. 35]- Sanctions (initially rated LC – No new rating)*

34. In its 2<sup>nd</sup> MER, Burkina Faso was rated LC on R.35. The major technical deficiencies were the lack of dissuasive and proportionate sanctions and the fact that the types of sanctions for non-compliance of DNFBPs with AML/CFT requirements were not explicitly provided for by law.

35. The MER of Burkina Faso noted that the lack of sanctions for non-compliance of DNFBPs with the AML/CFT requirements was mainly due to the lack of supervisory and monitoring authority for DNFBPs. Decree No. 2019- 1237/PRES/PM/MINEFID / MSECUMJ of 10/12/2019, designates for each of the DNFBP categories, with the exception of Chartered and Certified Accountants, and the AML/CFT supervisory authority. Article 4 of the said Decree gives sanctioning powers to these supervisory and monitoring authorities in case of DNFBPs' non-compliance with AML/CFT obligations. However, no indication of the range of administrative and disciplinary sanction for non-compliance with AML/CFT, defined by the respective supervisory authorities has been made available or provided by the country. Consequently, their effective, proportionate and dissuasive nature cannot be assessed.

**36. The above-mentioned deficiencies are still outstanding. Burkina Faso remains rated LC with R. 35.**

## **3.2. Progress on Recommendations which have changed since the MER**

### *3.2.1. Recommendation 2 (Originally rated PC- No new rating)*

37. In its 2<sup>nd</sup> MER, Burkina Faso was rated PC on R.2. The major technical deficiencies were: lack of cooperation and coordination mechanisms in the fight against the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and lack of national ML/TF policies informed by the risks identified.

38. With regard to the cooperation and coordination mechanism to combat the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in December 2019, Burkina Faso extended the prerogatives of the CNCA to the fight against the financing of proliferation through Decree n° 2019- 1236/PRES/FM/MINEFID/MSECUMJ of 10/12/2019, on the responsibilities, composition and functioning of the National Committee for the Coordination of Activities against money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This Decree gives the CNCA a national scope, particularly by placing it under the supervision of the Minister of Finance. Similarly, its mandate has been extended to the conduct and monitoring of national risk assessment and the mutual evaluation of the AML/CFT & P regime.

39. The CNCA is presented as the cooperation and coordination framework to fight against PF. This progress has resolved the deficiency identified in the MER.

40. The issue of lack of national ML/TF policies informed by the risks identified is still pending. The country, through the CNCA-LBC/FT, indicates that it has initiated discussions with technical and financial partners, particularly the UNODC, for the implementation of the NRA action plan as well as the development and implementation of the next AML/CFT strategy.

41. The ME on-visit to Burkina was concluded on 7<sup>th</sup> August 2018. Since then, R.2 has been revised with the addition of a new criterion (C5). This criterion relates to the need for compatibility between the implementation of AML/CFT requirements and those of data protection and respect for privacy and other necessary provisions (e.g. security and location of data). The update provided by the country (Analytical tools of TC Questionnaire completed and all the accompanying literature) has not addressed this issue, which makes it impossible for the measures currently taken by the country in this regard to be assessed, in a bid to comply with this new requirement.

42. Burkina has made efforts to strengthen national cooperation and coordination in the fight against ML/TF and financing of proliferation, particularly by broadening the prerogatives of the CNCA to the fight against PF. No action has been taken by the country to comply with the new requirement introduced following the adoption of its MER.

43. **The deficiencies identified are still moderate. The PC rating on Rec.2 remains.**

### *3.2.2. Recommendation 15 [R. 15] (initially rated C - New rating - PC*

44. In its second MER, Burkina Faso was rated C on R.15. In October 2019, the FATF revised the evaluation methodology for R.15, to reflect changes to its standards incorporating virtual assets (VAs) and Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs). These new obligations include: requirements relating to the identification, assessment and understanding of AML/CFT risks associated with VA activities or VASP operations; the obligation for VASPs to be licensed or registered; the obligation for countries to implement adequate risk-based AML/CFT supervision to VASPs (including sanctions) and for this supervision to be carried out by a competent authority; as well as the obligation to apply measures relating to preventive measures and international cooperation on VASPs.

45. Burkina Faso has not provided any information on the measures taken to comply with the new requirements of Recommendation 15.

46. Based on the new ML and TF opportunity provided for the virtual assets' ecosystem, the new deficiencies identified in Burkina Faso's AML/CFT is apparently moderate.

47. **The rating for Recommendation 15 has been downgraded to PC.**

### 3.3. Progress Brief overview of the other Recommendations rated NC/PC

48. Burkina Faso, for now, is not in any position to request for any new rating on the other nine (9) Recommendations rated NC or PC in the MER. However, Burkina Faso has embarked on initiatives to resolve the deficiencies identified regarding R.6, R.7 R.8, R.14, R.19, R.24, R.25, R.26 and R.32 with a view to improving its AML/CFT regime and finally exit the enhanced follow-up process. They include assigning to the CNCA, by Decree, the role of a competent authority in charge of coordinating the national response to the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, the operationalization of legal divisions specialized in economic and financial crimes and terrorism. These specialized legal divisions are now functional and deal with several cases of money laundering and predicate offences, as well as terrorism and terrorist financing.

49. In terms of prospects, Burkina Faso has mentioned the ongoing updates of its legislations on administrative freezing mechanism and targeted financial sanctions that allows for the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373 in Burkina Faso, the development of AML/CFT Guidance for non-financial reporting entities, the development of monitoring and supervision guides for non-financial sector reporting; training of supervisory and monitoring authorities as well as non-financial sector reporting entities on guidelines and monitoring guides.

50. Burkina is intending in 2020 to develop a new AML/CFT enhancement strategy that will include aggregating the National Risk Assessment (NRA) action plan and Recommendations of the ME.

51. Burkina Faso indicates that the accomplishment of these measures will serve in the short term to resolve a good number of deficiencies to improve the performance of the AML/CFT regime and exit the country from the enhanced follow-up process.

## IV. CONCLUSION

52. Burkina Faso has made progress in resolving the Technical Compliance deficiencies identified in its MER **and** had an upgrading in ratings on R.5 initially rated **PC** which are presently rated Compliant (**C**). The ratings on Recommendations R.2- **PC**, R4-**LC** R.22- **PC**, R.28- **NC**, R.34- **PC**, and R35-**LC** remain unchanged. Due to the non-compliance of the Burkinabe AML/CFT regime with the new requirements of Recommendation 15, the rating has been downgraded from Compliant - **C** to Partially Compliant - **PC**.

53. Consequently, considering the progress made by Burkina Faso's since the adoption of its MER, its technical compliance with the FATF Recommendations has been reassessed as follows:

**Table 2. Technical Compliance with new ratings May 2020**

<b>R.1</b>	<b>R.2</b>	<b>R.3</b>	<b>R.4</b>	<b>R.5</b>	<b>R.6</b>	<b>R.7</b>	<b>R.8</b>	<b>R.9</b>	<b>R.10</b>
LC	PC	C	LC	C	PC	PC	PC	C	LC
<b>R.11</b>	<b>R.12</b>	<b>R.13</b>	<b>R.14</b>	<b>R.15</b>	<b>R.16</b>	<b>R.17</b>	<b>R.18</b>	<b>R.19</b>	<b>R.20</b>
LC	LC	LC	PC	PC	LC	LC	LC	PC	LC

<b>R.21</b>	<b>R.22</b>	<b>R.23</b>	<b>R.24</b>	<b>R.25</b>	<b>R.26</b>	<b>R.27</b>	<b>R.28</b>	<b>R.29</b>	<b>R.30</b>
C	PC	LC	PC	PC	PC	C	NC	C	C
<b>R.31</b>	<b>R.32</b>	<b>R.33</b>	<b>R.34</b>	<b>R.35</b>	<b>R.36</b>	<b>R.37</b>	<b>R.38</b>	<b>R.39</b>	<b>R.40</b>
C	PC	LC	PC	LC	C	LC	LC	LC	LC

54. Burkina Faso will remain in the enhanced follow-up process, because 14 Recommendations are rated PC/NC for technical compliance. Similarly, the 11 Immediate Outcomes are rated Moderate/Low for effectiveness. In accordance with GIABA procedures, Burkina Faso is hereby invited to submit its second Follow-up report in May 2021.

**GIABA Secretariat**  
**February 2021**

## ANNEX B: DESIGNATION OF SUPERVISORY AND MONITORING AUTHORITIES OF DNFBP

N°	STAKEHOLDERS	LINE MINISTRY	SUPERVISION AND CONTROL AUTHORITIES
1	Lawyers	Ministry of Justice	General Directorate of Public Judicial Officers
2	Public Notaries		
3	Bailiffs		
4	Auctioneers		
5	Administrators and Judicial representatives		
6	Tax advisers		
7	Company and trust service providers		
8	Real Estate Companies and Trusts	Ministry in Charge of Home Affairs	Development and Construction Operations Directorate (DGC-OAC)
9	Real Estate Agents and Locators	Ministry in Charge of Finances	Tax Directorate (DGI)
10	Business introducers to Financial Institutions		Treasury and Public Accounting Directorate (DGTCP/DAMOF)
11	Casinos, gambling and LONAB (National Lottery)		Treasury and Public Accounting Directorate (DGTCPIDELF)
12	Travel and tourism tourism agencies	Ministry in Charge of Culture and Tourism	Tourisme Directorate
13	Hotels and restaurants		Tourisme Directorate
14	Agents and promoters of cultural events		Arts Directorate
15	Antique and art dealers and art's works		Cultural Patrimony Directorate
16	Transport companies for people and good	Ministry in Charge of Transports	Land and Maritimes Transports Directorate
17	Car Dealers And Car Rental services		
18	Public works Companies (TP)	Ministry in Charge of Infrastructures	Studies and Sectoral Statistics Directorate
19	Non Profit Organizations (NPOs)	Ministry in Charge of Territorial Administration	Public Liberties and Political Affaires Directorate (DGLPAP)
20	Trade in precious stones and precious metals	Ministry in Charge of	Mines Directorate

N°	STAKEHOLDERS	LINE MINISTRY	SUPERVISION AND CONTROL AUTHORITIES
		Mines	
21	Agents and promoters of sporting events	Ministry in Charge of Sports	Directorate Sports
22	Cash-in-transit companies	Ministry in Charge of Security	National Police Directorate (DGPN/DSP)
23	Security companies and investigation investigation companies		
24	Marketers of petroleum products and lubricants	Ministry in Charge of Trade	Anti-Fraud Mobile Control Brigade at Petroleum products Management Companies
25	Petroleum management companies petroleum products (SONABHY and others)		



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## Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Burkina Faso

### 1st Follow-up Report

The report also looks at whether Burkina Faso measures meet the requirements of FATF Recommendations that have changed since their Mutual Evaluation in 2019.

Follow-up Report

