EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the first time the FATF is undertaking a project which concentrates on professional money launderers (PMLs) that specialise in enabling criminals to evade anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing safeguards and sanctions in order to enjoy the profits from illegal activities. The report aims to describe the functions and characteristics that define a “professional” money launderer, namely those individuals, organisations and networks that are involved in third-party laundering for a fee or commission. This report is therefore focused on money laundering threats as opposed to vulnerabilities, and it addresses criminal actors, including organised crime groups that specialise in the provision of professional money laundering services and complicit actors who are knowingly involved, or are deliberately negligent, in the laundering process. While PMLs may act in a professional capacity (e.g. lawyer, accountant) and serve some legitimate clients, the report aims to identify those actors who serve criminal clients whether on a full-time or part-time basis.

PMLs provide services to criminals and organised crime groups by laundering the proceeds of their illegal activities. As the main purpose of PMLs is to facilitate money laundering, they are rarely involved in the proceeds-generating illegal activities. Instead, they provide expertise to disguise the nature, source, location, ownership, control, origin and/or destination of funds to avoid detection. PMLs generally do not differentiate between drug dealers, fraudsters, human traffickers or any other criminal with a need to move or conceal ill-gotten gains. These are all potential PML clients. PMLs operate under a number of business models and may be individuals; criminal organisations with a clear structure and hierarchy; or networks of loosely affiliated members. Providing services to criminals and organised crime groups, PMLs are criminal actors, profiting from these money laundering activities.

PMLs may provide the entire infrastructure for complex money laundering schemes (e.g. a ‘full service’) or construct a unique scheme tailored to the specific needs of a client that wishes to launder the proceeds of crime. These PMLs provide a menu of generally applicable services, with the result that the same laundering techniques (and potentially the same financial channels and routes) may be used for the benefit of multiple organised crime groups. As such, professional money laundering networks may act transnationally in order to exploit vulnerabilities in countries and particular businesses, financial institutions, or designated non-financial businesses or professions. PMLs, themselves, pose a threat to the financial system, as they facilitate money laundering and criminality more broadly, profiting from these illegal activities. The results of FATF’s fourth round of mutual evaluations reveal that many countries are not sufficiently investigating and prosecuting a range of money laundering activity, including third-party or complex money laundering. Many countries continue to limit their investigations to self-launderers: criminals who
launder the proceeds of drug trafficking, fraud, tax evasion, human trafficking or other criminality. While this may address in-house or self-laundering, it does not impact on those specialised in providing criminals with money laundering services. PMLs, professional money laundering organisations and professional money laundering networks can survive law enforcement interdiction against any of its criminal or organised crime group clients, while still standing ready to support the next criminal clientele. Effective dismantling of PMLs requires focused intelligence collection and investigation of the laundering activities, rather than the associated predicate offences of the groups using the services of the PMLs. The dismantling of PMLs, can impact the operations of their criminal clients, and can be an effective intervention strategy against numerous criminal targets.

This report identifies the specialist skill sets that PMLs offer their clients in order to hide or move their proceeds, and provides a detailed explanation of the roles performed by PMLs to enable authorities to identify and understand how they operate. This can include locating investments or purchasing assets; establishing companies or legal arrangements; acting as nominees; recruiting and managing networks of cash couriers or money mules; providing account management services; and creating and registering financial accounts. This report also provides recent examples of financial enterprises that have been acquired by criminal enterprises or co-opted to facilitate ML. The analysis shows that PMLs use the whole spectrum of money laundering tools and techniques; however, the report specifically focuses on some of the common mechanisms used to launder funds, such as trade-based money laundering, account settlement mechanism and underground banking.

The project team also examined potential links between PMLs and terrorist financing, however, there was insufficient material provided to warrant a separate section on this topic. The Khanani provides the clearest example of a professional money laundering organisation, providing services to a UN designated terrorist organisation. One delegation also noted potential links between a loosely affiliated professional money laundering network and a domestically designated terrorist organisation. However, the vast majority of cases submitted relate to money laundering, rather than terrorist financing.

The non-public version report also explores unique investigative tools and techniques that have proved successful in detecting and disrupting PMLs to guide countries that are seeking to address this issue. The report includes a number of practical recommendations that are designed to enhance the identification and investigation of PML; identify strategies to disrupt and dismantle these entities; and identify steps to prevent PML. Combatting these adaptable PMLs requires concerted law enforcement and supervisory action at the national level, appropriate regulation and effective international co-operation and information exchange. This report emphasises the need for a more co-ordinated operational focus on this issue at a national level, and the importance of effective information sharing between authorities at an international level. The report also identifies the information and intelligence required to successfully identify, map, and investigate PMLs, with the objective of disrupting and dismantling those involved in PML and their criminal clientele.
This report intends to assist authorities at jurisdictional level target PMLs, as well as the structures that they utilise to launder funds, to disrupt and dismantle the groups that are involved in proceeds-generating illicit activity so that crime does not pay.